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SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS
Carlos E. Lazarus*
DONATIONS INTER VIVOS: FORMAL REQUIREMENTS-ONEROUS
AND REMUNERATIVE DONATIONS
In addition to the purely gratuitous donation inter vivos, articles
1523-25 of the Louisiana Civil Code also contemplate the making of
gratuitous dispositions which either impose charges on the recipient
or compensate him for services rendered. These are denominated
onerous and remunerative donations, respectively. But these articles
also provide that these dispositions do not constitute real donations
if the value of the thing given does not manifestly exceed the value
of the charge imposed or if the value of the service to be compen-
sated, appreciable in money, is little inferior to the value of the gift,
and that consequently, in such cases, the "rules peculiar to dona-
tions" do not apply.' These articles were the basis for the decision in
Succession of Danos,2 in which the succession representative sought
to obtain certain bank certificates of deposit from the defendant,
who alleged that the certificates had been given to her by the
deceased for services she had performed for him. Having determin-
ed that the aggregate value of the certificates ($26,091.97) greatly
exceeded (by one-half) the value of the services ($12,110), the First
Circuit Court of Appeal, although declaring that the "trial judge was
correct in holding that it was a remunerative donation," must have
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. The necessary implication is that these dispositions are in reality commutative
contracts in which the onerous character of the contract prevails, there being no
animus donandi on the part of the donor. This is particularly true of a disposition
made in compensation for services which constitutes a veritable dation en paiement in
which the services rendered have a monetary value (article 1525 says "appreciated in
money") for which the donee would have the legal right to enforce payment. Other-
wise, the disposition would constitute a simple donation, unless the donor had
acknowledged himself as debtor by virtue of the natural obligation created by the ser-
vices. See Succession of Henry, 158 La. 516, 104 So. 310 (1925).
In the opinion of the writer, although the question whether the value of the gift
manifestly exceeds the value of the charges or whether the value of the services is lit-
tle inferior to the value of the gift appears, by the language used in articles 1524 and
1525, to be relative to the values involved and is to be determined in each case as any
other question of fact, article 1526 fixes a mathematical formula which apparently
allows the court to reach a determination of the issue as a matter of law. Thus, where
the value of the gift exceeds by one-half the value of the charge imposed or the value
of the service to be compensated, and in which the disposition partakes of both a com-
mutative and a gratuitous contract, the gratuitous character of the contract prevails
and it is therefore subject to the rules of donations.
2. 359 So. 2d 679 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 362 So. 2d 577 (La. 1978).
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determined that the disposition was purely gratuitous because it af-
firmed the trial court's judgment declaring it null for lack of form.'
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS: FORMAL REQUIREMENTS -CAPACITY
In Succession of Kite," the surviving children of the deceased
brought an action to annul the probated statutory will of the deceased,
alleging that the testator did not know how to read and that,
therefore, the will was invalid.' In affirming the lower court's judg-
ment declaring the will invalid, the appellate court noted that
although the evidence adduced by the defendant-proponent tended
to show that the testator could identify numbers in a telephone
directory and further established that the testator could sign his
name, the defendant had absolutely failed to produce any evidence
establishing the testator's ability to read.!
3. Article 1536 provides that donations of incorporeal rights must be made by an
act passed before a notary public and two witnesses.
A similar question was presented to the Second Circuit Court of Appeal in Burkes
v. Barbour, 364 So. 2d 1059 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978), in which the deceased, by an act
under private signature, had assigned his shares in a savings and loan association to
the defendant and had added the name of the defendant to the savings account book
and in the records of the association; the attempted donation was declared null for non-
compliance with article 1536 of the Civil Code. The court also held that the disposition
could not have been characterized as a remunerative donation because the services
alleged to have been performed by the defendant had been already fully compensated
in cash.
An identical question was presented to, and an identical result reached by, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in Succession of Palermo, 359 So. 2d 1040 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1978), which involved bank savings and checking accounts and savings ac-
counts in building and loan associations alleged to have been donated by the delivery
of the passbooks and other documents of title.
4. 366 So. 2d 602 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
5. LA. R.S. 9:2443 (Supp. 1952), as amended by 1964 La. Acts No. 123, provides in
pertinent part: "[Tihose who know not how or are not able to read, cannot make
dispositions in the form of the will provided for in Revised Statutes 9:2442, nor be at-
testing witnesses thereto." Insofar as applicable to the capacity of the testator, this
provision would not prevent a person who is unable to read from making a valid
statutory will if confected pursuant to Act 333 of 1976, which amended Revised
Statutes 9:2442 to provide the method for and the formalities to be observed in the
confection of the testament when the testator is blind or is unable to read. See The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-Successions and
Donations, 37 LA. L. REv. 421 (1977).
6. Although it should be observed that the testimony on behalf of the plaintiffs
appeared to preponderate in favor of the testator's complete illiteracy, it appears that
the court was more concerned with the inability of the defendant to establish the
capacity of the testator than with the ability of the plaintiffs to prove the incapacity of
the deceased at the time of the making of the will. It is true that article 2932 of the
Code of Civil Procedure ordains that if the action to annul a probated testament is in-
stituted within three months from the date of probate, as was the case here, the defen-
dant has the burden of proving the authenticity of the testament and its validity as to
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A nuncupative will by private act was declared null in Succes-
sion of Roussel7 for non-compliance with the formalities required by
articles 1581 and 1594 of the Civil Code.' The will had been dictated
by the testator to a notary in Vacherie, Louisiana, a community
situated partly in St. James Parish and partly in the parish of St.
John the Baptist. Of the six Vacherie residents who had witnessed
the will, 9 four resided in the St. James side of the town and two in
the St. John the Baptist side. 10 Adhering strictly to the provisions of
the above cited articles of the Code, the Louisiana Supreme Court,
thus determining that there were only four qualified witnesses
residing in the parish where the will was executed, declared it an
absolute nullity under article 1595.
There were at least four cases during this term in which the re-
quirements of article 1588 of the Civil Code were invoked. In Succes-
sion of Posey," the trial judge refused to admit to probate a hand-
printed document as an olographic will because it had not been writ-
ten and signed in longhand. In affirming, however, the appellate
court based its decision on the grounds that the proponent had failed
to produce the two credible witnesses required by article 2883 of
the Code of Civil Procedure to prove that the document had been
written by the deceased. Hence, it found it unnecessary to resolve
the other issue."
In Succession of Montero,5 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal,
form; nevertheless, it is the plaintiff in nullity who bears the burden of proving the in-
competency of the deceased at the time of the confection of the will. Lewis v. Dejean,
251 So. 2d 124 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 La. 879, 253 So. 2d 215 (1971). This
issue was presented this term in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in Succession of
Zinsel, 360 So. 2d 587 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978), in which a judgment dismissing a peti-
tion to annul a statutory will was affirmed, the plaintiff having failed to discharge his
burden of establishing lack of testamentary capacity.
7. 373 So. 2d 155 (La. 1979).
8. These articles require that the testament be executed in the presence of five
witnesses residing in the place, ie., in the parish, in which the will is received.
9. The report of the case does not indicate whether the six subscribing witnesses
were in addition to the notary to whom the will appears to have been dictated, or
whether the notary was counted as one of the six. Nor does it indicate why the testa-
ment was not initially offered for execution as a nuncupative will by public act,
without probate.
10. This was a determination of fact made from the evidence presented, which
was contrary to the determination made by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. See
Succession of Roussel, 365 So. 2d 908 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
11. 367 So. 2d 1243 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
12. It is suggested that a document, whether hand-printed or written in longhand,
meets the "entirely written" requirement of article 1588 of the Civil Code. Cf.
Prudhomme v. Savant, 150 La. 526, 90 So. 640 (1921) (admitting to probate a typewrit-
ten document as a nuncupative will by public act).
13. 365 So. 2d 929 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
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on the authority of Succession of Boyd,' properly upheld the validity
of an olographic will dated "5/29/74," the evidence showing beyond
dispute that it had been written on May 29, 1974, while the testator
was awaiting surgery. Succession of White," on the other hand,
presented a more delicate question. The district judge denied the
probate of a purported olographic will bearing only the month and
day "November 15" because, without a year or suggested year in
the hand of the testator, there was no date at all (as distinguished
from an ambiguous date). Therefore, it failed to conform to the re-
quirements for the olographic will. Also relying on Boyd, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeal reversed, taking the position that the docu-
ment indeed had a date, although an incomplete one, and remanded
the case for the purpose of admitting extrinsic evidence to resolve
the ambiguity."
In Succession of Burke,17 the questioned document was a printed
form-designed for a statutory will-that the deceased had com-
pleted by filling in the blanks in his own hand."8 In affirming the
14. 306 So. 2d 687 (La. 1975).
15. 367 So. 2d 161 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
16. This is indeed a departure from the position taken by the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Succession of Lefor 139 La. 51, 71 So. 215 (1916), and in Succession of Boyd,
306 So. 2d 687 (La. 1975). In Lefort, the court stated:
There is a physical difference between a document without a date and one with
an uncertain date. There is a legal difference between supplying a missing date,
or any part of it, by facts outside the will, and establishing certainty concerning
an ambiguity, or uncertainty, or doubt in an existing date. The former cannot be
done because it is of the essence of the validity of a will that it be dated "by the
hand of the testator" (C.C. 1588, [1581]), and it cannot be "dated" in any other way
139 La. at 78, 71 So. at 235. And in Succession of Boyd, after quoting the above
passage, Justice Dixon continued:
The approach used in the Succession of Lefort . . . is supported by reason, and
comes much closer to accomplishing the public policy of the State .... There is a
physical difference, said the court in Lefort, between a document without a date
and one with an uncertain date. An absent date cannot be supplied, for it must
come from the hand of the testator. An ambiguous date is an entirely different
matter ....
306 So. 2d at 692. The writer submits that the decision of the trial court was correct.
A "date" that lacks any of its component parts (the day, month, and year) or a date in
which the component parts are unclear or ambiguous and cannot be reasonably ascer-
tained by other admissible evidence constitutes no date at all. It is unfortunate that
the supreme court was not given the opportunity to pass upon this very important
issue.
17. 365 So. 2d 858 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
18. The hand-written portions of the document were the date "Jan. 15, 1961" and
the words "to my sister Delia (Mrs. M. J. Derbes); my interest in property at 6315
West End Blvd.-Also whatever Bank Balance I have in the Whitney National Bank,
City Branch Bank-and Insurance as covered by Policy of F. F. Hansell & Bro. Ltd. To
be shared equally with my other sister Mrs. C. A. Schreiner." Id. at 859.
[Vol. 40
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decision of the trial judge to admit the document to probate as an
olographic will, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal noted that
although the printed form contained many words that had to be
disregarded, the necessary animus testandi was unmistakably pres-
ent in the words written by the deceased which were in themselves
sufficient "to provide the essential formalities for an olographic
will.'.
19. Id. at 860. The writer is in agreement that the presence of extraneous printed
matter, such as might appear in letterheads or business stationery, should not affect
the validity of an otherwise valid olographic testament. Succession of Heineman, 172
La. 1057, 136 So. 51 (1931); Jones v. Kyle, 168 La. 728, 123 So. 306 (1929). The same
may be said of words appearing on printed forms such as those considered in the
Burke case. But the rationale of these cases should not be unduly extended. Although
article 1589 of the Civil Code provides that words added by another are considered not
written, it is obvious that it has reference only to words added by another without the
consent or approval of the testator. If it were not so, it would be within the power of
anyone to frustrate the will of the testator by simply inserting additional words
therein. If, however, the words are added by another with the consent of the testator,
it is evident that the testament will not have been confected by the testator entirely
by his own hand; and it would, for that very reason, be invalid. See Succession of
Walsh, 116 La. 185, 117 So. 777 (1928).
